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BRADWELL V. STATE: SOME
REFLECTIONS PROMPTED BY MYRA
BRADWELL'S HARD CASE THAT MADE
"BAD LAW"
Charles E. Corker*
On April 14, 1873, the Supreme Court decided in the Slaughter-
House Cases' that "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States"2 protected by the new fourteenth amendment did not include
the right of New Orleans butchers to practice their trade free of the
regulation imposed by a Louisiana statute.3 The following day, April
15, the Court decided in Bradwell v. State4 that neither the fourteenth
amendment nor the state privileges and immunities clause, article IV,
section 2, clause 1,5 compelled Illinois to admit Mrs. Myra Bradwell
to the bar of that state, although she was qualified except for her sex
and married status.
The Slaughter-House Cases are required reading for every serious
student of American constitutional law. The decision has long been
thought to explain, if anything can, why the fourteenth amendment's
privileges or immunities clause has never been significant. Bradwell v.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; A.B., 1941, Stanford University;
LL.B., 1946, Harvard University.
The author's colleague, Professor Marian Gallagher, was a collaborator at every
stage in the preparation of this paper. Its plural "we" reflects the disappointed anti-
cipation that she would permit herself to be identified as co-author. Because she is
the doughty type, she has nevertheless agreed to accept full responsibility for all
errors and omissions, and precisely 50.2% of the responsibility for the views ex-
pressed concerning the Equal Rights Amendment.
1. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36(1873).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. An Act to Protect the Health of the city of New Orleans, to Locate the Stock
Landings and Slaughter Houses, and to Incorporate 'The Crescent City Live Stock
Landing and Slaughter House Company," No. 118, 1869 Louisiana Acts 170 (1869).
The important parts of this statute are reproduced in Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) at 38-43.
4. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). See generally C. FAIRMAN, VI HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88,
PART ONE (P. Freund ed. 1971). The Fairman work is a wealth of both facts and
insights to this period of history, including but not limited to the dates of the two
cases. His volume is a treasure house which would surely delight Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., whose devise made possible the gift of this scholarly work to the United
States.
5. Reproduced at note 29 infra.
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State, however, is read, if at all, only by students of the constitutional
law of sex discrimination, for whom it serves only as a milestone from
which to measure progress. 6 Although the Slaughter-House Cases
have indelibly marked the Constitution-the fourteenth amendment's
privileges or immunities clause failed meaningfully to survive the de-
cision-Myra Bradwell's case has been as thoroughly excised from
the constitutional law of today as Dred Scott v. Sandford7 and its
Pyrrhic victories for chattel slavery.
Even though Bradwell has absolutely no current precedential val-
ue, the case deserves study alongside the Slaughter-House Cases. Had
it not been necessary to decide Bradwell the next day, the five-to-four
majority in Slaughter-House probably would have been replaced by at
least that large a majority the other way.
For the Slaughter-House majority, Bradwell was an easy case. If
the citizens of the United States had no privileges or immunities pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment, it followed that citizen Myra
Bradwell had none either. But Bradwell was hard for those who dis-
sented in Slaughter-House and yet concluded that Myra Bradwell had
no constitutionally protected right to practice law. If, as the four
Slaughter-House dissenters had strenuously insisted, the fourteenth
amendment's privileges or immunities clause protected a citizen's
right to pursue his calling, but Myra Bradwell had no similarly pro-
tected right to practice law, it became necessary to explain either how
a butcher's trade and a lawyer's profession are different, or why a
married woman is not qualified to practice law.
In his concurring opinion to Bradwell, joined by two of the other
Slaughter-House dissenters, Justice Joseph P. Bradley declared that,
under the "law of the Creator" and "the common law tradition," a
married woman has no place outside the home and is therefore funda-
mentally unqualified to practice law.8 His conspicuous failure to re-
concile his positions in Slaughter-House and Bradwell with any credi-
6. E.g., K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG, H. KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
SEX BASED DISCRIMINATION 4 (1974).
7. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (slave had no right to sue in federal court
because he was neither citizen of state nor of United States). It is only a curiosity
that Dred Scott was not expressly overruled until Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
271-87 (1901). The most pejorative symbol Shepard's Citations awards Bradwell is
"e" for "explained." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 640 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
8. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Field and Swayne, JJ.,
both joined the Bradley concurrence.
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bility seriously weakened the dissenters' position in Slaughter-House
for a majority of the Justices and their contemporaries.
Justice Bradley's resort to the "law of the Creator" weakened the
Slaughter-House dissent in at least one other way. The Slaughter-
House dissenters had powerfully argued that "privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States" included all fundamental rights. But
in Bradwell, they demonstrated no better way to ascertain what "fun-
damental rights" are than to consult the "law of the Creator."9 Justice
Bradley's reliance upon such subjective authority made Justice Mil-
ler's Slaughter-House opinion appear by comparison to be judicial
statesmanship despite its having unnecessarily constricted the scope of
fourteenth amendment protection.
Only Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase dissented in both cases. Unfor-
tunately, the Justices did not have the benefit of his written opinion in
reaching their decision-he was in poor health and died three weeks
later.
Bradwell and Slaughter-House deserve study together for a second
reason. These two decisions provide useful lessons for our time about
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).10 They demonstrate that the
consequences of a constitutional amendment-particularly one writ-
ten in abstract and grand terms like the fourteenth amendment or the
ERA-are unpredictable and dependent upon imponderables such as
the sequence of cases on the Court's calendar.
I. THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE
DECISION
The Supreme Court's decision in Slaughter-House seems altogether
improbable and its survival for at least 104 years is incredible. The
more closely the decision is examined, the more its continued validity
challenges all ordinary explanations.
An accurate description of the Slaughter-House decision might
have been written on April 14, 1873, under this headline: COURT
STRIKES CENTRAL CLAUSE FROM CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT." This hypothetical headline, however, would not
9. Id. at 141-42.
10. H.RJ. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972), discussed in Part
III infra.
11. One must read the text of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment, pushing back
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have accurately reflected what the majority said. Although the Court
denied the claims of the New Orleans butchers that they had a consti-
tutional right to practice their calling, it said that many privileges and
immunities of United States citizens exist, and it offered a number of
examples.12 Only the dissenters complained that the Court had made
of the privileges or immunities clause "a vain and idle enactment,
which accomplished nothing." 13 These complaints could have been
disregarded, however, as characteristic of exaggerations by dissenters
who have lost a heated constitutional argument.1 4
A. The Death of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
As it has turned out, Slaughter-House was a final requiem for the
fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities clause. "Final," of
course may yet prove to be an exaggeration. t 5 The clause beckons the
the preconceptions which come from familiarity, to appreciate the central position of
the stricken privileges or immunities clause:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall mnake or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
12. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79-80.
13. Id. at 96 (dissenting opinion of Field, J., joined by Chase, C.J., Swayne. &
Bradley, JJ.). Justice Swayne wrote a separate dissent which states in part:
The first section of the fourteenth amendment is alone involved in the con-
sideration of these cases. No searching analysis is necessary to eliminate [sic)
its meaning. Its language is intelligible and direct. Nothing can be more trans-
parent. Every word employed has an established signification. There is no room
for construction. Elaboration may obscure, but cannot make clearer, the in-
tent and purpose sought to be carried out.
Id. at 126.
14. The Slaughter-House Cases were only a first skirmish. Justice Miller wrote
again for the Court in upholding the 1879 amendment to the Louisiana constitution
which abrogated special privileges of the Crescent City "monopoly" and all like it.
Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., IIl U.S. 746 (1884). Justice Field, id. at
754, and Justice Bradley, id. at 760, now joined by Harlan and Woods, JJ., restated
their Slaughter-House views with renewed vigor, though the Court remained divided
on this issue five to four.
Although the dissenting Justices gave up eventually on the privileges or immunities
clause, the due process clause served their purpose. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 589 (1897). a unanimous Court expressly approved Justice Bradley's Butchers
Union Co. dissent: "The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is
an inalienable right." Ill U.S. at 762. This inalienable right, denied to the New Or-
leans butchers, found a textual home in its identification with "liberty"-liberty of
contract-in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
15. The express overruling of Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) (right
to transact business in any state free from discriminating taxes is protected by
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Court in each generation to give it meaning and content. It has misled
countless lawyers. Hopeless constitutional causes have been pro-
longed by the illusion that the privileges or immunities clause must
mean something significant. Good constitutional arguments have
been threatened when lawyers have argued illusory privileges or im-
munities when they should have argued other parts of the Constitu-
tion.' 6 Because of the Court's reliance upon the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment17 to protect the fun-
damental rights which might have been protected by the privileges or
immunities clause, and because the clause has been at the center of so
many disappointed hopes and false starts, the possibility of its revival
in the future now seems quite remote.
In 1918, Professor Dudley 0. McGovney described the Court's
Slaughter-House opinion as a judicial rewriting. The clause was rati-
fied in this form:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... 18
According to McGovney, the Court in Slaughter-House rewrote the
clause to say:
privileges or immunities clause) (6-3 decision), in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S.
83 (1940) (7-2 decision), underscores the absence of present hope that the privileges
or immunities clause may live again. Resurrection has been tried and has failed.
For a more optimistic view, see Benoit, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment: Can There Be Life After Death?, 11 SUFFOLK L. REv.
61 (1976); Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round
at Last?," 1972 WASH. L.Q. 405.
16. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause-Fourteenth Amendment, 4
IowA L. BULL. 219, 222-23 (1918), counted more than 40 Supreme Court cases and
300 state court cases in which the fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities
clause had been unsuccessfully and mistakenly argued.
17. Both the due process clause and the equal protection clause extend beyond
"citizens of the United States" to "persons"--aliens and corporations. Anyone ready
to dismiss rights of corporations as outside civil libertarian concerns needs to be
reminded that most of the press protected by the first amendment is incorporated.
E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ("Pentagon Papers"
case). If the Slaughter-House Court had decided that "privileges or immunities"
meant "fundamental rights," this deficiency would probably by now have been cor-
rected. In Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
497 (1844), the Court declared a corporation a state citizen for purposes of article
III, and quite possibly a corporation would have been declared a citizen of the
United States for purposes of "privileges or immunities" before now. Such action by
the Court, however, would have been harder to justify for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment than it would have been for purposes of article III because "citizen"
and "person" are juxtaposed in the fourteenth amendment, implying that each means
something different.
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge any privi-
lege or immunity conferred by this Constitution, the statutes or trea-
ties of the United States upon any person who is a citizen of the Unit-
ed States. 19
In effect, the rewritten version adds only repetition to the
Constitution. "Privilege or immunity" must be found elsewhere in the
Constitution, or in a statute or treaty. Although statutes and treaties
do not create "constitutional rights" in a usual sense, the supremacy
clause from the beginning placed federal statutes and treaties beyond
state impairment.20 Thus, the Court would have been more realistic
had it simply declared, "The privileges or immunities clause is hereby
deleted from the Constitution."
Of course, such bold words would have caused not only headlines,
but deserved suspicion of judicial usurpation. Justice Miller's Slaugh-
ter-House opinion for the Court avoided such headlines and suspicion
while achieving the effective deletion of the clause by simply saying
one thing and doing another. The Court explicitly acknowledged the
limits of its function when, after ten pages of its opinion, it announced
that it would construe the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments only
"so far as we have found them necessary to the decision of the cases
before us, and beyond that we have neither the inclination nor the
right to go."2' At that point in its opinion, the Court had gone quite as
far as was necessary to decide the case before it. The Court had decid-
ed that Louisiana could regulate slaughterhouses for the promotion of
public health and that the challenged regulation did not interfere with
a privilege or immunity of a United States citizen, whatever such priv-
ileges or immunities were. In the remaining fifteen pages, 22 the Court
needlessly destroyed the fourteenth amendment's privileges or im-
munities clause as the source of any new or independent con-
stitutional right.
B. The Validity of the Slaughter-House Statute
The issue resolved in the first ten pages of the Court's opinion was
19. McGovney, supra note 16, at 220 (emphasis in original to show limiting
words added by judicial construction).
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land .... "
21. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 67.
22. Id. at 67-83.
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the constitutional validity of a Louisiana statute which created the
Crescent City Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company, and
gave it an exclusive right for twenty-five years to operate livestock
landings, stockyards, and a slaughterhouse in the 1,154-square-mile
area of the state which includes New Orleans.23 Louisiana butchers
claimed that the Crescent City Company was a monopoly which vio-
lated the rights of butchers of New Orleans under the thirteenth
amendment and all three clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court denied that the statute created a monopoly; the dissenters said
it did.24 Clearly it did not with respect to the butchers' calling. Any
butcher continued free to practice his trade in facilities provided by
the Crescent City Company at charges fixed in the Louisiana legisla-
tion.25 Nevertheless, the statute imposed a restriction on the right of a
butcher, or anyone else, to operate his own slaughterhouse, his own
stockyard, or his own livestock landing in the three-parish area cov-
ered by the statute.
The Court viewed the creation of the corporation as a reasonable
means to further the legitimate constitutional end of protecting public
health:
If this statute had imposed on the city of New Orleans precisely the
same duties, accompanied by the same privileges, which it has on the
corporation which it created, it is believed that no question would
have been raised as to its constitutionality. In that case the effect on
the butchers in pursuit of their occupation ... would have been the
same as it is now.26
The dissenters disregarded this statement of the issue. For them,
the case presented this broader question posed by Justice Bradley: "Is
it one of the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States to
pursue such civil employment as he may choose to adopt, subject to
such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by law?"'27
23. See note 3 supra.
24. Reporter Wallace identified the butchers' position as the "argument against
the monopoly." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 44-56 (running head). This tilted sympathies
toward the dissent not only because monopolies have few friends, but also because it
was common knowledge that this monopoly was the corrupt creature of a venal,
carpetbagging legislature. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 4, at 1321-24.
25. No attack was made on the reasonableness of the charges, although fixing
prices for 25 years by statutory specification is not a sensible venture. For example,
the statute fixed the price of slaughtering beeves at $1 each, hogs and calves at 50
cents each.
26. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 64.
27. Id. at 112 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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By answering this question "no," the Court rendered irrelevant its
determination that the Louisiana statute was a reasonable exercise of
the state's police power. If United States citizens have no constitution-
ally protected right to pursue their callings, the reasonableness or un-
reasonableness of Louisiana's interference with that unprotected right
simply could not matter. Thus, even if the challenged legislation had
been totally unreasonable and oppressive-even if it had arbitrarily
denied the butchers all right to be butchers-any federal remedy
would have been beyond the constitutional power of Court or Con-
gress. Alternatives by way of due process and equal protection were,
in 1873, still beyond the horizon. The butchers made due process and
equal protection arguments, but the Court peremptorily rejected
them.28
C. The Sources of "Privileges or Immunities"
The Court and the dissenters turned to the same sources to discover
what "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"
means: article IV, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution, which pro-
tects "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States"; 29
the gloss on the article IV clause provided by Justice Washington, on
circuit in 1823, in Corfield v. Coryell;30 and article IV of the Articles
of Confederation, the predecessor to the article IV clause of the Con-
stitution.
For the majority, Justice Miller asserted that the privileges and im-
munities protected by article IV of the Constitution were intended to
be the same as those protected by the Articles of Confederation. He
assumed that the express guarantee to "the people of each State" of
"free ingress and regress to and from any other State" in the Articles
of Confederation's counterpart to the privileges or immunities clause
was an example of these same privileges and immunities rather than a
right supplementing such privileges and immunities. It should follow
that free travel through the states is a privilege and immunity protect-
ed by article IV of the Constitution. Yet Justice Miller contradicted
28. Id.at8O-81.
29. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
30. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3.230). The dictum is
quoted by the Court, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 76, and by Justices Field, id. at 97, and
Bradley, id. at 117.
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this reasoning later in his opinion when he asserted that the right to
free travel arises from the constitutionally implied guarantee of the
citizens' right to travel, unimpeded by the states, to the seat of nation-
al government. 31 Thus, article IV of the Articles of Confederation had
a broader effect than Justice Miller's Slaughter-House opinion recog-
nized.
For the dissent, Justice Bradley found persuasive support for a
"fundamental rights" interpretation in the words of the Constitution's
article IV which protect rights of citizens "in the several States," not
"of the several States. ' 32 The point was lost on Justice Miller. He mis-
quoted article IV to read "citizens of the several States." 33
Justice Washington's dictum was relied upon by both the majority
cand dissent; it is perfectly ambivalent. Corfield v. Coryell decided that
New Jersey could protect its oysters for its own citizens, and forbid
their taking by sojourning citizens of neighboring states. "Privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States" are confined to fun-
damental rights, of which taking oysters is not one. 34 But Justice
Washington did not say whether there are article IV privileges and
immunities which a state must respect even in its own citizens. What-
ever Justice Washington meant, it seems certain that members of Con-
31. Justice Miller wrote the Court's opinion in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35 (1868), rendered several months before the fourteenth amendment was
ratified, which recognizes the "right to travel" based solely on what Professor Charles
Black, Jr., has taught us to call "structural" considerations. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). The right to travel is one of the re-
dundantly enumerated "privileges or immunities" in Justice Miller's catalogue of
examples in Slaughter-House. Concurring opinions in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941), by Justices Douglas (joined by Black and Murphy, JJ.) and Jackson,
invoke the privileges or immunities clause, rather than the commerce clause, to reject
California's attempt to stop indigent Okies and Arkies (no longer pejorative terms)
at the state line. Id. at 177, 181.
The commerce clause is not adequate protection for the right vindicated in Crandall
and Edwards because Congress can legislate to forbid interstate commerce, but neither
is the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, so long as it is
confined to "citizens." "Structure" is probably the best foundation, so long as Professor
Black is available to explain why structure prevails as against the apparently intended
distinction in the fourteenth amendment between "persons" and "citizens."
32. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 117.
33. Id. at 75. Maybe reporter Wallace or a gremlin at Caxton Press of Sherman
& Co., Philadelphia, was responsible for misquoting the Constitution. At any rate,
the error has been generally reproduced and faithfully perpetuated.
34. According to McGovney, supra note 16, at 227, Justice Washington per-
formed the service of explaining that "all Privileges and Immunities" means "some
Privileges and Immunities." A central problem with both the article IV and the
fourteenth amendment clauses is that both sets of words are too broad to be taken
literally. The line between the fundamental and the nonfundamental is hard to draw
when no criteria are provided.
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gress who read the dictum to each other understood "privileges and
immunities" to mean "fundamental rights." If anything less were pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment, it would not serve the federal
courts or Congress in protecting citizens of the United States against
the states.
Both the Court and the dissenters may have been overly occupied
by such niceties. The important considerations were the recent history
and events which had occasioned the fourteenth amendment. All
three post-Civil War amendments were designed to assure completion
of the unfinished tasks of the abolition of slavery and the reconstruc-
tion of the Union. The first sentence of the fourteenth amendment
conferred state and national citizenship upon "all persons born or na-
turalized in the United States." State citizenship assured all future liti-
gants like Dred Scott access to federal courts, 35 but the consequences
of United States citizenship were specified in the Constitution, if at
all, only in the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment. If "privileges or immunities of citizens" meant only such
privileges or immunities as citizens might have from other provisions
of the Constitution, the clause was merely repetitious, creating confu-
sion and false hopes.
Justice Miller's opinion for the Court was candidly resistant to the
basic purpose of the fourteenth amendment-to increase federal pow-
er. Although he conceded that the amendment arose from the Civil
War experience, which taught that the republic is in more danger
from the states than from a usurping federal government, yet, wrote
Justice Miller, it remained the Court's function to preserve a "balance
between State and Federal power." 36
Did this not overstep the judicial function? The post-Civil War
amendments had been intended to change the preexisting federal-state
balance. Abolition of slavery would be a disaster unless the fourteenth
amendment were given full effect: former slaves were to be full citi-
zens and the United States courts and Congress were to be invested
with plenary authority to protect all citizens of the United States in
their basic rights.
On April 14, 1873, the Slaughter-House dissenters had clearly the
better of the arguments and they should have prevailed. They had a
35. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 412 (1857) (opinion of
Taney, C.J.). Women and minors, by contrast, were recognized by the Court as
citizens, although not permitted to vote. Id. at 422.
36. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 82.
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constitutional text with the grandest words contained in the docu-
ment. They had the history of the Civil War and they had the necessi-
ties of the nation in reconstruction supporting them. Why did the dis-
senters not prevail, if not in 1873, then soon thereafter? Bradwell v.
State, decided the following day, provides the only plausible
explanation.
II. BRADWELL v. STATE-THE HARD CASE THAT
MADE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE A PERMANENT
LANDMARK
Asked to choose up sides on the issues which divided the Court in
Slaughter-House, the overwhelming majority of today's law students
will side with the dissenters. The right to pursue a common calling or
occupation is fundamental. Surely it should be protected as one of the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." By compar-
ison, today's law students unanimously agree that Bradwell was ludi-
crously wrong.
The paradox is that the narrowest of possible majorities in Slaugh-
ter-House produced an internally inconsistent opinion which still re-
mains beyond peradventure the law of the land with respect to the
fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities clause. In contrast,
Bradwell, an eight-to-one decision with no dissenting opinion, is to-
day no more than an historic artifact, so thoroughly discredited that
the Supreme Court could not now announce its overruling without be-
ing suspected of judicial frivolity. The explanation for this paradox
lies in Justice Bradley's weak and subjective concurring opinion in
Bradwell.
Justice Miller again wrote for the majority in Bradwell. The only
authority cited in his opinion to support the Court's position that the
fourteenth amendment did not protect Myra Bradwell's right to prac-
tice law was the Slaughter-House Cases. Justice Bradley's answer to
the Court's Slaughter-House argument, that the privileges or immuni-
ties clause was meant to protect fundamental rights, was persuasive,
but it would have led to a dissent in Bradwell had he not abandoned
his principle under the guise of applying "the law of the Creator." Jus-
tice Bradley's explanation, in unblushing prose, why "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" protected butchers in
225
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their common calling, but not a qualified woman lawyer in the prac-
tice of her profession, is as follows:
It certainly cannot be affirmed, as an historical fact, that [the right
of women citizens to pursue any lawful employment including the
practice of law] has ever been established as one of the fundamental
privileges and immunities of the sex. On the contrary, the civil law, as
well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should
be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family or-
ganization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony,
not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should be-
long, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband.
... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general
constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases. 37
The Chicago Legal News, Myra Bradwell, editor, commented on
Bradwell v. State in an editorial captioned The XIV Amendment and
Our Case.38 While respectfully disagreeing with the Court's construc-
tion of the privileges or immunities clause, the editorial regarded Jus-
tice Bradley's concurring opinion to be in serious conflict with his
Slaughter-House dissent:
If, as [Justice Bradley] says, the liberty of pursuit [of lawful employ-
ment] is one of the fundamental privileges of an American citizen,
how can he then, and be consistent, deprive an American citizen of the
37. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141-42 (emphasis added). The emphasized phrase,
"privileges and immunities of the sex," deserves a grade below passing in the art of
question begging. The fourteenth amendment says "citizens" and "persons," not
"sex." "Race" and "color" do not appear either. Moreover, the amendment was not
adopted merely to reaffirm established dogma, but to secure or to ratify change.
If the amendment were to be given the construction implicit in Justice Bradley's
"privileges and immunities of the sex," all its purposes would have been frustrated,
including the protections for Blacks. Before emancipation, Blacks had enjoyed no
"privileges or immunities" protected by the United States Constitution, and this was
the central reason for the fourteenth amendment.
38. 5CHICAGo LEGALNEws 390 (May 10, 1873).
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right to follow any calling or profession under laws, rules and regula-
tions that shall operate equally upon all, simply because such citizen is
a woman?39
How indeed? Justice Bradley's attempt to answer that question was
a manifest failure: "the law of the Creator," without further support
from case or statute, is simply not credible authority for a temporal
court. Critics of natural law would say that Justice Bradley's resort to
"the law of the Creator" exemplifies all that is wrong with natural
law, in whatever version or manifestation. There is simply no way to
determine what it is except through divine revelation, of which we are
deprived in matters of government by the first amendment if not by
God's refusal to answer His mail.40 Supporters of natural law would
today, at least, charge Justice Bradley with having caricatured natural
law in his inappropriate ipse dixit. Justice Bradley's spurious reason-
ing did not defend, but rather was fatal to, the Slaughter-House dis-
sents.
39. Id. (emphasis in original). The editorial found Justice Bradley's Bradwell con-
currence to be especially inconsistent with the statements he made in Live-Stock Ass'n
v. Crescent City Live-Stock Co., 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408)
(Bradley, Circuit Justice & Woods, Circuit Judge):
There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right to pursue un-
molested a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is nothing more nor less
than the sacred right of labor....
.'Public policy may require that these pursuits should be regulated and super-
vised by the local authorities, in order to promote the public health, the public
order and the general well being. But they are open to all proper applicants, and
none are rejected except those who fail to exhibit the requisite qualifications ....
All of these systems of regulation are useful and entirely competent to the gov-
erning power; and are not at all inconsistent with the great right of liberty of pur-
suit, which is one of the fundamental privileges of an American citizen.
Id. at 652-53.
40. Justice Bradley might have found an abundance of theological citations, pro
and con, in R. CALLIS, SEWERS 250-55 (2d ed. 1685), where the learned author dis-
coursed at length on whether the Countess of Warwick was qualified to be Commis-
sioner of Sewers. E.g., "For Debora was Judge of Israel, and Judged the people as
the fourth of Judges hath it." Id. at 251 (italics in original).
[Y] et the Statute of Justices of the Peace is like to Jethro's counsel to Moses,
for there they speak of men to be Justices, and seemeth thereby to exclude
women; But our Statute of Sewers is, Commission of Sewers shall be granted
by the King to such person and persons as the said Lord should appoint; So
the word persons stands indifferently for either Sex; And therefore although
by the weakness of their Sex they are unfit to travel, and they be for the most
part uncapable of learning to direct in matters of Judicature, for which causes
they have been discretely spared, yet I am of opinion ... that this honorable
Countess being put into Commission of the Sewers, the same is warrantable by
the Law; and the Ordinances and Decrees of Sewers made by her and the other
Commissioners of Sewers, are not to be impeached for that cause of her Sex."
Id. at 252-53 (italics in original).
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Slaughter-House and Bradwell were far from the victories that My-
ra Bradwell had hoped for and sought-a broad reading of the
fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities clause to protect
butchers and women. Nevertheless, her editorial response to the
Bradwell decision demonstrated that no Justice of the United States
Supreme Court could provide any real basis for distinguishing be-
tween privileges or immunities enjoyed by men and those enjoyed by
women except by a most childish rhetoric.
Even before her case was argued before the Supreme Court, Myra
Bradwell had already won her cause in Illinois. On March 22, 1872,
the Illinois legislature passed the following act:
[N] o person shall be precluded or debarred from any occupation,
profession or employment (except military) on account of sex: Provid-
ed, that this act shall not be construed to affect the eligibility of any
person to an elective office.
... Nothing in this act shall be construed as requiring any female to
work on streets or roads, or serve on juries.41
Had Justice Bradley known that the Illinois legislature had mooted
Myra Bradwell's case, he might have avoided proclaiming the "law of
the Creator" to be contrary to the law then in force in Illinois.
Myra Bradwell applied twice to the Illinois supreme court for ad-
mission to the bar and argued her own case in that court.42 Although
she never applied a third time, she was admitted twenty years later on
41. Act of Mar. 22, 1872, 1871-1872 Ill. Laws 578.
42. Myra Bradwell's application to the Illinois supreme court was accompanied
by a certificate, pursuant to rules of court, by an inferior court judge and the state's
attorney that they had examined her, found her qualified, and recommended that a
license should be issued to her. Her sponsor's motion was accompanied by an appli-
cation, which she prepared, citing an Illinois statute which read: "When any party
or person is described or referred to by words importing the masculine gender,
females as well as males shall be deemed to be included." 2 ILL. STAT. ch. 90, § 28
(Purple 1856). Unless this statutory principle were applied, women would not have
existed for any of the purposes of the Chancery Code of the state because woman,
female, she, her, or any other feminine pronouns were not to be found therein.
The Clerk was instructed by the court to advise her that she could not be ad-
mitted "by reason of the disability imposed by your married condition-it being
assumed that you are a married woman" until the disability might be removed by
legislation. She renewed her application with an additional brief which is much the
best filed on either side of her case in either the Supreme Court of Illinois or of the
United States. The only opposing brief, as a matter of fact, is the opinion of the
Illinois supreme court denying her admission. In re Bradwell, 55 I11. 535 (1869).
All these matters are reported verbatim in 2 CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS 145-47 (Feb.
5, 1870).
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the Illinois supreme court's own motion; she was admitted to practice
before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1892.4 3
Seven years after her death in 1894, her victory was explained:
Discussion of the Myra Bradwell case had the inevitable effect of let-
ting sunlight through many cobwebbed windows. It is not so much by
abstract reasoning as by visible examples that reformations come and
Mrs. Bradwell offered herself as a living example of the injustice of
the law. A woman of learning, genius, industry and high character, ed-
itor of the first law journal in the west, forbidden by law to practice
law, was too much for the public conscience, tough as that conscienceis .44
III. LESSONS FOR OUR TIME?
The Slaughter-House Cases and Bradwell v. State support one tru-
ism we need not belabor: freedom and equality are indivisible. Unless
their judicial protection by the Constitution flows from principled de-
cisions, a constitutionally protected right of butchers to pursue their
calling is unlikely to be more secure than the right of a woman lawyer
to pursue hers. Principle-articulated and widely understood-is
more important to the law of the Constitution than the voting majori-
43. 1 THE BENCH & BAR OF ILLINOIS 279 (J. Palmer ed. 1899).
Myra Bradwell is remembered in Illinois as she should be throughout the nation.
The state bar journal recently described her as "doughty." Kogan, The Illinois State
Bar Association: Its First Fifty Years, 65 ILL. B.J. 270, 270 (1977). One dictionary
describes the word as meaning "marked by fearless resolution and by stoutness in
contest or struggle." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 680 (1961).
Doubtless she was all that. But the dictionary's illustrations of the word's usage in-
dicate a trait she did not have: "[T] he doughty little man had not a hand's breadth
on hand or arm without its scar." "[H] e was a soldier's soldier-rough, tough, and
doughty." Id. Myra Bradwell, however, was neither rough, tough, nor scarred, yet
her determination, her work, and her life eventually, though belatedly, carried the
day. She thoroughly discredited the gratuitous insult delivered by Justice Bradley in
his Bradwell concurrence. The Bench and Bar of Illinois described her as follows:
"A noble refutation of the ofttimes expressed belief that the entrance of women in
public life tends to lessen their distinctively womanly character, she was a most
devoted wife and mother, her home being ideal in its love and harmony." I THE
BENCH & BAR OF ILLINOIS 281 (J. Palmer ed. 1899).
44. Quoted from an unidentified source in Note, Death of Mrs. Myra Bradvell,
28 AM. L. REV. 278, 280 (1894), which described her legal journal, the Chicago
Legal News, as "one of the best legal periodicals in the United States." Id. The
Chicago Legal News was founded by Myra Bradwell in 1863 and its publication was
continued after her death in 1894 by her husband, James, and their daughter,
Bessie Helmer. Following James Bradwell's death in 1907, Bessie Helmer carried on
as editor and publisher through the final issue on July 16, 1925. Spector, Woman
Against the Law: Myra Bradwell's Struggle for Admission to the Illinois Bar, 68
ILL. HIsT. Soc'Y 228, 242 n.44 (1975).
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ty on any particular day among the Justices. The most persuasive and
careful judicial opinion filed on April 14 can be destroyed on April 15
by its signers' abandonment of principle. So much for the self-evi-
dent.45
As March 22, 1979 approaches, the last day on which the ERA
submitted by Congress in 1972 may be ratified,46 a number of ques-
tions that would have been deeply interesting to Myra Bradwell are
being considered: Would ratification of the ERA add significantly to
the substance of the Constitution? Would a failure of the requisite
thirty-eight states to ratify the amendment threaten Congress' power
to enact legislation protective of women's rights? Would such a failure
affect the evolving case law concerning sex discrimination under the
equal protection clause? If the Constitution must explicitly say "sex"
to forbid discrimination against women, is it not likewise necessary
that it say "race," "religion," "nationality," "illegitimacy," and a great
many other things? Myra Bradwell's experience with the privileges or
immunities clause may shed light.
A. Ratification of the ERA is Unlikely To Significantly Affect
Constitutional Protection of Women's Rights
Slaughter-House and Bradwell-and constitutional development in
the intervening 104 years-are compelling evidence that the conse-
quence of amending the Constitution by adding words of high level
abstraction is unpredictable. 47 "Privileges or immunities of citizens of
45. See generally Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1977), for an
impressive attempt to articulate the basis for a workable distinction between the
judicial and the legislative function, between "principle" and "policy." Contrast the
pragmatic realism of Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
46. H.RJ. Res. 208, 86 Stat. 1523 (1972), passed the Senate on March 22, 1972.
86 Stat. at 1524. The resolution requires ratification within seven years, and article
V of the Constitution specifies that three-fourths of the states must approve. With the
rejection by the Florida legislature in April 1977, the count among the states stands
at 35 to 15, with a total of 38 states required. Nonratifying states are, in the West,
Nevada, Arizona, and Utah; in the South, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia; in the
Midwest, Missouri and Illinois. Nebraska, Tennessee, and Idaho have repealed earlier
ratification. The effect, if any, of repeal presumably may be determined by Congress,
possibly by the Supreme Court, or conceivably by the General Services Administra-
tion. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1938). Dates of ratifications are listed in
[1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1015, 1015. Only North Dakota and Indiana
have ratified since 1974.
47. One can conjecture that the absence of any former slave as a party to the
Slaughter-House and Bradivell cases, and any issue in the case about slavery, its
abolition, or about reconstruction, made it easier for the Court to hold that the
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the United States," instead of having been construed as something
similar to "fundamental rights," has so far turned out to mean nothing
at all significant. Nevertheless, we hazard this prediction: the ERA,
which becomes effective two years after its ratification, is likely to
alter no recent decision of the Supreme Court based upon the Consti-
tution, nor is it likely to change the course of future judicial decisions
in sex discrimination cases in any ascertainable way. The ERA will
add only repetition, and possibly confusion, to the Constitution.
The words of the ERA are these:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.48
We believe it proper and probable that the Supreme Court will read
those words as saying in another way what the fourteenth amendment
has said since 1868:
No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 49
We can find no principle of constitutional construction by which
force and effectiveness are added to whatever the Constitution says
twice. Such a principle, if invented and recognized, would subtract
force and effectiveness from what the Constitution says only once.
The ERA would add only two clear textual changes to the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. First, the ERA expli-
citly bars sex discrimination by the United States as well as sex dis-
crimination by a state. Second, the ERA says "sex" explicitly instead
of implicitly.50
Civil War amendments had not changed the pre-Civil War federal-state constitutional
balance in any important way. Even so, it took 101 years from the time of the
surrender at Appomattox until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-
1973p (1970), was upheld by the Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966), effectively to enforce equality under the laws with respect to
voting by all races which the fifteenth amendment expressly commanded in 1870.
Black voters have since been an effective voting minority which no major political
party is likely to alienate. Women have constituted a majority of the legal voters of
the nation, without widespread interference or intimidation, since soon after the rati-
fication of the nineteenth amendment in 1920.
48. H.RJ. Res. 208, 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
49. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment is quoted in full at note 11 supra.
50. "Gender" is more appropriate for grammatical classifications than for those
of sex:
Gender may have been based on physical distinctions originally, but it is hard
to say what they were. . . .Some languages have more genders than others.
French, for example, has two and the Bantu languages have twenty. In any case,
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The first addition has no apparent consequence since Bolling v.
Sharpe,51 companion case to Brown v. Board of Education,52 invoked
the fifth amendment due process clause to desegregate the public
schools of the District of Columbia. If there is any reason to doubt
this conclusion, Congress has urgent reason to submit immediately a
constitutional amendment to make the equal protection clause appli-
cable to protect both citizens and other persons from action by the
United States. Watergate should serve as a reminder that the forces of
justice are not invariably centered in the United States Department of
Justice under the direction of the Attorney General.
The ERA's second textual addition of substance is probably equal-
ly inconsequential. Explicit reference to "sex" adds nothing to what is
already clearly implied. In 1873, the Court acknowledged that a pri-
mary purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to provide or to clari-
fy the power of Congress and the federal courts to protect citizens and
others from discrimination on account of race. Yet the fourteenth
amendment does not explicitly say "race." 53
If the failure of the fourteenth amendment explicitly to say "race"
was originally a defect, it has long been overcome. We think it a
strength, however, not a defect. In the Constitution, as in every other
human communication, the most important things may be those
gender is not a grammatical reflection of sex. In Old English, which had three
genders, wife was neuter, woman masculine, moon masculine, and sun feminine.
B. EVANS & C. EVANS, A DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN USAGE 195 (1957)
(italics in original).
Peter Farb, whose expertise is in anthropological linguistics, recognizes the sexual
chauvinism of English. He tells us, however, that because language responds to its
own rules, efforts at language reform are unlikely to do much good. He comforts
us with the assurance that "sexism" in language has little correlation with "sexism"
in society. He notes as examples Turkey and the Ozark Mountains of Missouri where
the language is nonsexist but where the culture is backward with respect to the status
of women. P. FARB, WORD PLAY 160-64 (Bantam ed. 1975).
Serious proposals to take gender-based language out of the United States Code by
substituting "'sibling" for "brother" and "sister," "human race" for "mankind," and
"child" for "daughter" or "son" have been associated-regrettably in our view-with
issues of sex discrimination which the law and lawmakers should take seriously. See
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEX BIAS IN THE U.S. CODE 15-16 (April 1977).
It is not true, however, as this publication asserts, that "no appropriate sex-neutral
term is available" for "aunts, uncles." Id. at 119. "Parents' siblings" serves the purpose,
because "siblings" would be the replacement for "brothers, sisters." Id.
51. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. Justice Harlan, a severe critic of the "compelling interest" doctrine, em-
braced race as the subject of strict scrutiny because of the historic purposes of the
equal protection clause. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
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which are not expressly stated. They go without saying. The original
Constitution protected racial slavery, without saying "race" or "slav-
ery," until the thirteenth amendment abolished the institution. The
Civil War produced three constitutional amendments, but not one of
them says that no state may secede from the Union. That proposition
has gone without saying since Lee's surrender at Appomattox, and has
at least as solid a constitutional foundation as if a post-Civil War
Congress had struggled to amend the Constitution to say that no state
may ever leave the Union, alone or in combination with other states,
regardless of reasons or grievances. 54
Recognition of the "goes-without-saying" principle is essential to a
functioning Constitution.55 If this principle were excised from the
Constitution, the institution of judicial review itself might not survive.
If it were to be excised from the fourteenth amendment only, sex
would be only one item on a long list of invidious discriminations for
which a constitutional amendment would be needed: religion, politi-
cal beliefs, legitimacy, poverty, national origin, age, youth, handi-
caps, and so forth. The case for the ERA is unavoidably a case for
amendomania of possibly fatal magnitude. Article V, we might well
be reminded, limits constitutional amendments to occasions when
two-thirds of the House and Senate "deem it necessary," and whether
these words speak only to Congress and the people, rather than to the
federal courts, they are important.56
Of course, "denied or abridged" in the ERA may be a stronger
imprecation than "deny" in the equal protection clause. Furthermore,
the ERA has immense symbolic importance. Perhaps it has more sym-
bolism than any prior constitutional amendment because, at present,
54. United States v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), could be cited for the
proposition, which we would label dictum, that states cannot-and the Confederate
States of America legally did not-secede.
55. Perhaps the principle needs a label (and maybe it has one which we have
overlooked). Chief Justice Marshall was perhaps reaching for it in Marbury v. Mad-
ison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). We are cautious about labels because they
stultify thought. What cannot be labeled, indexed, and catalogued must be reinvented
on each occasion. The necessity to restate stimulates thought. Handcrafted judicial
decisions, whatever else may be the prospects for mass production, will never be
replaced by the computer.
56. This argument was rejected in National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350
(1920), without the Court even addressing it. Justice Clarke's dissent in those cases
recalled with apparent wistfulness the Slaughter-House Cases, when the Court saw
its duty as one owed to the federal Union as originally constructed, a recent amend-
ment to the Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding. Id. at 411.
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it would add so little substance.5 7 Who can predict the strength or
weakness of such a symbol? 58
B. The ERA's Probable Effect Upon the Course of Judicial
Decision in Sex Discrimination Cases
A doctrinal argument to show need for the ERA is that its ratifica-
tion may persuade a majority of the Justices to declare what a plurali-
ty of four Justices were willing to say in Frontiero v. Richardson59 in
57. The ERA was submitted to the states exactly one hundred years after the
Illinois legislature acted to admit women to the bar. Closing "arguments" by the ERA
supporters were made by Senator John Sherman Cooper, distinguished Kentucky
Republican, and Senator Robert C. Byrd, Democratic Whip. Said Senator Cooper:
I must say that I believe we could secure by statute practically any question
to assure women necessary protection against discrimination. Some groups with
whom I have talked do not understand all of the grave questions raised about
their own protection and their own privileges. But they want, more than any-
thing else, the Congress of the United States, the people of the United States to
declare through a constitutional amendment they are equal to men and entitled
to all possible rights.
I must say that it is a compelling argument.
I am hopeful and I believe we have enough faith in our courts and in the
Supreme Court to interpret it in such a way that it will guarantee full rights, and
at the same time it will not remove women from the protections they need.
118 CONG. REC. 9597 (1972).
Senator Byrd followed, saying that he shared many of the concerns of Senator Sam
Ervin of North Carolina (the most articulate of the ERA opponents) and of Senator
Cooper, but he would vote for the amendment. Id. at 9598.
Roll was called, but before the vote was announced the galleries were admonished
to observe the Senate rule against demonstration. The vote was 84 to 8. "[Demon -
strations in the galleries.]" Id. Contrast the 56 to 25 vote (54 required) which sub-
mitted the nineteenth amendment to the states on June 4, 1919: "[Applause on the
floor and in the galleries.] " 58 CONG. REC. 635 (1919).
58. Symbolism, if universally perceived as such, should be unobjectionable. The
nineteenth amendment assuring women's suffrage was submitted to the states in
1919 and proclaimed a part of the Constitution on August 26, 1920. Thus, ratifica-
tions by Virginia in 1952, Alabama in 1953, Florida in 1969, Georgia and Louisiana in
1970, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ANNOTATED, S. Doc. No.
92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 n.l1 (1973), were fully as innocuous although less
exciting than would have been the posthumous award of a general's commission in
the National Guard of those states to General William T. Sherman.
Our Appendix sets forth the Senate Judiciary Committee's statement of reasons
why the ERA was thought necessary. All of the five Supreme Court decisions cited
therein are clearly no longer law.
59. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell found it un-
necessary to decide whether sex is an "inherently suspect" classification. Id. at 691. He
gave some support to the belief that ratification of the ERA will make it so when he said
that the ERA's adoption would resolve "this precise question." Id. at 692. He neither
stated the premise for this view nor the significance of its resolution. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun joined his opinion.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), demonstrates that any vigil to await an
answer from the ERA is at best unnecessary and at worst futile. Trimble addressed
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1973: that sex is a "suspect classification" which requires a "compel-
ling state interest" for constitutional justification. The prediction is
not implausible as predictions go, but its major premise-that explicit
identification in constitutional text is the touchstone of strict scruti-
ny-lacks visible support. 60 In Graham v. Richardson,61 the Court
declared that classifications based upon alienage, a criterion not ex-
pressly identified in the Constitution, are "inherently suspect." Fur-
thermore, the fifteenth amendment expressly bars racial discrimina-
tion in voting rights, but it has not by reason of its specificity
displaced the fourteenth amendment as a first choice in dealing with
racial discrimination in voting.62
More important, however, is that even if sex were to become a
"suspect classification"-with or without the influence of the
ERA-the consequences would be by no means clear. Persuasive evi-
dence that the suspect label makes no significant difference is found
the issue whether Illinois could permit an illegitimate child to inherit from her mother,
but not from her father. Justice Powell, writing for a five-Justice majority, said no,
based on the conclusion that although illegitimacy is a classification calling for "'less
than strictest scrutiny,'" the proper standard was "'not . . .toothless.'" Id. at 767
(quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)). It was unnecessary for the
Court to attempt to describe the scrutiny appropriate to sex as a classification. Four
Justices joined in a dissent on the ground that they found the case "constitutionally
indistinguishable from Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971)." Id. at 777. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Blackmun joined Justice Rehnquist's separate
dissent, which would have upheld the Illinois statute because it was "not mindless and
patently irrational." Id. at 786.
Conceivably, the ERA might have affected the mode of anilysis, but quite clearly,
it would not have affected the result. Classifying degrees of scrutiny and weighing the
quality and quantity of the interest required to satisfy each degree has become an
exercise of less and less utility in predicting what a fragmented Court is likely to do.
Although it is a 5-4 decision, Trimble will remain a decision binding on all other
courts until expressly or impliedly overruled. It would not be overruled by even a
unanimous opinion of the Court explicating strictness of scrutiny with respect to ille-
gitimacy or sex in abstract terms.
60. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968), the Court emphasized the
specificity of the first amendment's establishment clause in upholding a taxpayer's
standing to challenge expenditures in violation thereof, but no principle beyond that
clause was announced. Whether and how many other such specific prohibitions there
may be was left to future decision. Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941), might be cited to support an opposite principle-that repetition
by amendment of what is implicit in the body of the Constitution adds nothing. In
Darby, the court stated, "The [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is re-
tained which has not been surrendered." Id. at 124.
61. 403 U.S. 365,372(1971).
62. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). There was no dissent from the
conclusion that gerrymandering Tuskegee, Alabama, to exclude black residents from
city elections was unconstitutional, but only Justice Whittaker's concurring opinion
would have rested the case on the fifteenth amendment rather than on the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 349.
235
Washington Law Review
in two contrasting descriptions by Justice Brennan in 1972 and 1973
of what the Court had decided about the strictness of its scrutiny in
Reed v. Reed,63 a unanimous opinion on sex discrimination by Chief
Justice Burger.
It was widely observed in 1971 that the Chief Justice's rhetoric was
a departure from the received opinion that, absent a suspect classifica-
tion or impairment of a fundamental right, any rational basis will sus-
tain a legislative judgment. In Reed v. Reed, the Court conceded that
the challenged statute, which preferred a male relative to a female rel-
ative of equal closeness in the appointment of administrator of a
decedent's estate, served a minimally useful purpose by making it un-
necessary for the judge to make a choice. This rational basis, howev-
er, was not enough to sustain the statute.
In 1972, in his opinion for the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird,64 a de-
cision holding a Massachusetts birth control statute unconstitutional,
Justice Brennan declared:
Of course, if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute
impinges upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold [v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 379 (1965)], the statutory classification would have to
be not merely rationally related to a valid public purpose but neces-
sary to the achievement of a compelling state interest .... But just as
in Reed v. Reed ... we do not have to address the statute's validity
under that test because the law fails to satisfy even the more lenient
equal protection standard.65
In contrast, in writing for a plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson in
1973, Justice Brennan had persuaded himself-and not implausi-
bly-that Reed v. Reed was, but for the express use of labels, an ex-
ample of close scrutiny:
63. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Disappointment among supporters of the successful litigants
in Reed was widespread. "Invocation of traditional equal protection language to
invalidate a sexually discriminatory law is hardly progressive." 1972 Wis. L. REV.
626, 632. See 43 Miss. L. REv. 418 (1972); 25 VAND. L. REV. 412 (1972). The
"strict scrutiny" hoped for is illustrated by the opinion of the late Justice Ray Peters
in Sailer Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
A bit longer perspective might have resulted in greater emphasis on the origin of
"suspect categories" in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). That deci-
sion upheld exclusion from their homes of American citizens of Japanese ancestry on
the grounds that military authorities, empowered by executive order, had concluded
that such exclusion was a military imperative. There is no credible evidence now,
and there was none in 1944, of the military necessity for Japanese relocation, confine-
ment, and curfews.
64. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
65. Id. at 447 n.7 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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At the outset, appellants contend that classifications based upon sex,
like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are
inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial
scrutiny. We agree and, indeed, find at least implicit support for such
an approach in our unanimous decision only last Term in Reed v.
Reed .... 66
In view of Justice Brennan's opinions in Eisenstadt and Frontiero,
can there be any doubt that an important determinant of whether a
classification is to be suspect is the linguistic preference of the opinion
writer?67 If all opinions on sex discrimination for thirty years were to
come from the same hand, and to be written for a unanimous Court,
the labels might become vested with great usefulness for prediction.
That condition is unlikely to prevail, however, and we should not la-
ment the prospect. Fresh rhetoric quickly becomes clich6. The clich6
not only kills thought, it conceals the fact of death.
Washington State has had its version of the ERA in its constitution
66. 411 U.S. at 682 (footnotes and citation omitted). See Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 13 (1975) (Blackmun, J.): "We find it unnecessary in this case to decide
whether a classification based on sex is inherently suspect." Stanton held that Utah
may not make the age of majority 18 for women, but 21 for men.
67. Those who take for granted the usefulness of classifications in judicial prose
by a formula that describes the strictness of judicial scrutiny should compare Archer
v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973), with Mercer v. Board of Trustees,
538 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976). See 8 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 714 (1977).
The Virginia court construed VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (" [T] he right to be free from
any governmental discrimination upon the basis of religious conviction, race, color,
sex, or national origin shall not be abridged, except that the mere separation of the
sexes shall not be considered discrimination.") to permit Virginia statutes to excuse
women responsible for the care of children under 17 from jury duty. The court
applied a rational basis formulation, and said of the ERA provision: "It is no broader
than the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States." 194 S.E.2d at 711.
The Texas court construed TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a ("Equality under the law
shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.
This amendment is self-operative.") to apply strict scrutiny under an explicit "two-
tier" analysis, but recognized the state's compelling interest in autonomy for school
authorities which permits them to apply haircut regulations to boys but not to girls.
Justice Stevens, concurring in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), wrote per-
suasively concerning strictness of scrutiny:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause....
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered analysis
of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of
deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain deci-
sions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion. I
also suspect that a careful explanation of the reasons motivating particular deci-
sions may contribute more to an identification of that standard than an attempt
to articulate it in all-encompassing terms.
Id. at 211-12.
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since 1972.68 Washington's experience may be enlightening for the
nation. Justice Charles J. Horowitz recently wrote an opinion for the
majority of a divided Washington Supreme Court in Gaylord v. Taco-
ma School District No. 10,69 upholding the power of a public school
to discharge an otherwise competent high school teacher on the
ground that his effectiveness was impaired by his students' knowledge
that their teacher was an active homosexual. This confounds the pre-
diction of student editors of the Yale Law Journal70 that the federal
ERA would "almost certainly" reverse a Minnesota supreme court de-
cision rejecting a claim to constitutional protection for a right to li-
censed homosexual marriage.71 It is noteworthy that in Gaylord, the
Washington Supreme Court-the majority and the dissenters-was
neither helped nor hindered by the state's ERA in reaching what was
obviously a difficult decision: the ERA simply was not discussed.
The Washington ERA has not, however, been without some appar-
ent influence. Justice Horowitz in 1975 wrote the majority opinion in
Darrin v. Gould,72 upholding the right of two girls in public high
school to engage in interscholastic football. He produced a balanced,
scholarly, and persuasive opinion, although this was not a case which
necessarily decided itself.73 He said that the court would reach the
same result whether it invoked strict scrutiny or followed Professor
68. "Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex." WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
69. 88 Wn. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
70. Comment, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE LJ. 573 (1973).
For the implicitly contrary view, see Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freeman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE
LJ. 871, 912 (1971). In a most comprehensive survey of the ERA's probable effects,
Professor Thomas Emerson and three Yale students conclude that the ERA is com-
patible with principles of the uniform law on marriage and divorce, which recognizes
that implicit in "marriage" is a relationship of two sexes. "[M] arriage is required to
be between a man and a woman." UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 201 (Com-
missioners' Note).
The student commentators were also unpersuaded by Senator Birch Bayh, chief
Senate sponsor of the ERA, who took the position that the ERA will do no such
thing. Comment, supra at 584.
71. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1972), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972). In Singer v. Hara, 11 Wn. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974),
the court of appeals arrived at the same result after the adoption of Washington's
ERA, rejecting arguments based upon the ERA, and on the eighth, ninth, and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 1199
(1975).
72. 85 Wn. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
73. The larger of the two girls was 14 years old, 5 feet, 9 inches tall, and
weighed 212 pounds. It is not clear whether the court adequately considered the
hazard to the young male psyche from the effects of playing opposite her in the line.
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Gerald Gunther's analysis (not associated with the ERA) of decisions
of the 1971 Term of the Supreme Court.74 The Washington court
found it unnecessary to decide any question under the federal equal
protection clause.
The ERA's worst hazard is illustrated by the concurring opinion in
Darrin v. Gould, which was joined by four Justices. We quote that
opinion in its entirety:
With some qualms I concur in the result reached by the majority. I
do so, however, exclusively upon the basis that the result is dictated by
the broad and mandatory language of Const. art. 31, § 1, Washing-
ton's Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Whether the people in enact-
ing the ERA fully contemplated and appreciated the result here
reached, coupled with its prospective variations, may be questionable.
Nevertheless, in sweeping language they embedded the principle of
the ERA in our constitution, and it is beyond the authority of this
court to modify the people's will. So be it.75
To conclude that Washington's citizens wrote sweeping language into
the state constitution beyond their capacity to understand, but which
has a remorseless compulsion over judges, forcing them dolorously to
say, "They knew not what they did; but so be it," is not only wrong,
but dangerous.76 On that premise, a stultifying form of constitutional-
ism has taken over, a nightmare which de Tocqueville might have in-
spired, but which even he did not predict.77 Such premise would lead
74. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) ("equal protection with bite").
75. 85 Wn. 2d at 878, 540 P.2d at 893 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
76. Darrin has not brought floods of girls to Washington gridirons. A similar but
more difficult question was presented in Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Ath-
letic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). In that decision, the court had only
the 109-year-old equal protection clause with which to hold unconstitutional Tennessee
high schools' use of girls' rules for girls' basketball. The successful plaintiff argued
that she was prejudiced by playing girls' rules in her expected career beyond high
school. ERA supporters might well be on the other side of such an argument, be-
cause the decision might result in so few players and teams willing to play that a
girl would be effectively foreclosed from playing any high school basketball with
girls from other schools.
77. The French commentator wrote:
An American judge, armed with the right to declare laws unconstitutional, is
constantly intervening in political affairs. ...
There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner
or later turn into a judicial one. Consequently the language of everyday party-
political controversy has to be borrowed from legal phraseology and conceptions.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA 247-48 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds.
1966).
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to the absurd result that the people are powerless to adopt an amend-
ment which might reject cases like Goesaert v. Cleary,78 which in the
dark ages upheld a Michigan statute barring a woman from tending
bar unless she was the wife or daughter of the owner, without risking
the constitutionality of every classification based upon sex. Mar-
riage-the heterosexual kind-has something to do with sex, and of-
ten quite explicitly. Does anyone seriously think that the ERA may
render unconstitutional the institution of marriage and all its support-
ing laws? Will it require a "compelling state interest" to save it? If
there are words of sweeping implication in our language which may
be slipped unsuspected into the Constitution, they are more danger-
ous than the iceberg which sank the Titanic. Our hope and conviction
is that the standard of interpretation of a new constitutional amend-
ment must be related to something the people adopting it might have
had in mind. If not, our constitutional system is out of control.
C. The ERA Will Have No Effect on Congress' Power To Enact
Legislation Protective of Women's Rights
Supporters of the ERA do not deny that much of what they hope it
accomplishes will be by legislation. Indeed, the enforcement clauses
of the ERA and the fourteenth amendment are identical, word for
word, comma for comma.
Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in January 1977, "With the
E.R.A. on the books, we may expect Congress and state legislatures to
undertake in earnest, systematically and pervasively, the law revision
so long deferred. History should teach that the entire job is not likely
to be done until the E.R.A. supplies the signal. '7 9
This is still an accurate description. It will become the prescription for disaster if
constitutions by the people are written in language which only judges, and not the
people, understand.
78. 335 U.S. 464 (1948), said to be overruled so far as inconsistent in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), which held unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute forbid-
ding boys to drink beer until age 21, but allowing girls to drink at age 18, despite a
record supported by evidence that girls have better driving records. Did the Oklahoma
legislature really think that boys will stand around and thirstily watch girls drink
beer?
79. Ginsburg, Let's Have E.R.A. as a Signal, 63 A.B.A.J. 70, 73 (1977). Professor
Gerald Gunther writes that Professor Ginsburg had prime responsibility for appel-
lant's brief in Reed and in other sex discrimination cases. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 771 n.2 (9th ed. 1975).
A good journalistic assessment of the lack of rationality in the rising opposition to
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We are confident that Professor Ginsburg did not intend to suggest
that any new legislation against sex discrimination should await the
effective date of the ERA. Because the ERA becomes effective two
years after it is ratified, that date may be as late as March 22, 1981.80
What changes if any the amendment will make in constitutional case
law await Supreme Court decisions much farther down the road. Nev-
ertheless, we know of no legislation, federal or state, now held up by a
rational doubt about its present constitutionality which ratification of
the ERA would dispel. To be sure, some ERA opponents and a few
ERA supporters have predicted that the ERA will bring surprising re-
sults-constitutionally compelled recognition of homosexual mar-
riage,81 conscription of women for infantry combat units in wartime,
prohibition of separate toilets for men and women. Such possibilities
merit little attention, because it is unlikely that any legislature will
wish to consider these proposals seriously. The possibility that the Su-
preme Court might reach any such result without legislation is even
more remote. A member of Congress fearing these possibilities should
be now pressing for an amendment to repeal the fourteenth.
While it is not altogether clear what Professor Ginsburg would in-
clude in "the entire job," it is clear that even a minimum job within
the present national consensus requires legislation. She may have in-
tended only to predict that Congress and state legislatures will pro-
crastinate, but such an emphasis on the ERA risks an inference that
delay in enacting remedial legislation is inevitable, necessary, or
justifiable. Such delay is none of these. Furthermore, we are not per-
suaded that the prophecy that ERA ratification will stimulate legisla-
tures to act is necessarily accurate.
Ratification of the ERA would mean many things to many people,
but to some it would mean that both sexes have achieved equal rights
under the supreme law of the land. A legislature firmly of that belief
might be expected to do no more than give thanks and declare a holi-
the ERA is found in Lear, 'You'll Probably Think I'm Stupid,' N.Y. Times, Apr.
11, 1976, § 6 (Magazine) at 30. The missing ingredient in most such appraisals,
however, is the basis for an affirmative belief to support the author's conclusion:
"Change is coming anyway, with or without an E.R.A. With, it will come faster and
far easier. Without, it will simply come." Id. at 121. This assertion is plausible
if one reads "with" literally, to mean "accompanying," and accepts the premise that
the ability to amend the Constitution measures the effectiveness of the "women's
movement." We find the assertion implausible if it suggests that the ERA will have
a causal relationship to change beyond its symbolism.
80. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
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day. Even a legislature in some doubt might recall that it is
emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,82 and thereby escape the crossfire from conflict-
ing demands by constituents.
When Professor Paul Freund wrote in 1971 that the ERA is not the
way to achieve equal rights for women,8 3 he had an uphill burden of
persuasion. The constitutional law of sex discrimination was then less
developed than the law of race discrimination before Brown v. Board
of Education in 1954.84 In 1978, however, any doubt that any reme-
dy desired lies with Congress and state legislatures has been dispelled.
Although some recent Supreme Court decisions have been disappoint-
ing, both in construction of federal statutes85 and in lack of
consistency in describing the appropriate standard of judicial scruti-
ny,86 Congress has the responsibility to correct the Court's federal
statutory construction. Verbal formulas by which the Court describes
standards of scrutiny are most unlikely to be clarified or much affect-
ed by an amendment which says nothing at all on that subject.
82. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
83. Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 234 (1971), made the case for legislation to achieve the objectives of
the amendment. That course of action has encountered no constitutional obstacles in
the years since he wrote.
84. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Appendix, infra, for a brief review of the state of the
law in 1972, contained in the Senate report on the joint resolution submitting the ERA.
85. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court held that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not forbid an employer from exclud-
ing pregnancy benefits from an employee's health insurance. Although this case was
decided only two years ago, its precedential value has been recently rendered uncertain.
A bill amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to reverse General Electric recently
passed the Senate by a vote of 75 (78 counting views of absent Senators formally
announced prior to the vote) to 11. S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
S 15,059 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1977).
Although Congress clearly has the present authority to alter the statute, as the
General Electric Company in the interest of its employees and its public relations
can alter its practice, it is not at all clear that ratification of the ERA would automa-
tically change the statute because discrimination by General Electric lacks the hall-
marks of federal or state action. See Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth A mend-
ments: Constitutional A uthority for Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimi-
nation, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313, 362 (1977).
86. Scrutiny under a statute is no less difficult to describe abstractly than constitu-
tional scrutiny. The opinion of the Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720
(1977), held that the bona fide occupational qualification in Title VII, which permits
valid sex qualifications, is "extremely narrow." How narrow "extremely" is, however,
is principally revealed to readers of the opinion by the facts of the case, in which a
woman applicant failed to meet height and weight requirements prescribed for employ-
ment in an all-male Alabama prison, as well as an explicit sex requirement adopted
during the litigation. When the issue relates to legislative interpretation, the ultimate
responsibility is legislative. When it relates to the Constitution, ultimate responsibility
is judicial.
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In 1978, with ratification uncertain, it seems a poor time to load
the ERA with added emotional cargo. It seems a good time to an-
nounce a victory for the equal rights of women-not the ultimate vic-
tory when all weapons may be beaten into plowshares, but an impres-
sive interim victory nonetheless. The consensus is that equal
protection of the laws now includes equal rights for women and men
and that equal protection extends to both federal and state action.
Who and where are the doubters? Let the signal for needed legislation
now sound.
Congressional submission of the ERA to the states, and thirty-five
state ratifications of the ERA, is one manifestation of victory. The fif-
teen abstaining states are not the bellwethers of the nation87 and
should not be allowed to appear so. Furthermore, it is not necessary
to renounce the ERA, either the achievements of its sponsors or the
ERA's prospects for the future.8
A strong argument for the ERA's ratification may be made on the
grounds (1) that to many it has become an all-important symbol, (2)
that the cause which the ERA symbolizes is just, and (3) that it is un-
likely to do harm. This is a fair assessment even though it is not a
theme for which Julia Ward Howe could write words to the tune of
"John Brown's Body" and inspire a Union Army.
If it were widely understood that the ERA is only declaratory and
symbolic, we would have little cause for concern. That perception,
however, is not widely shared. Rather, it is contradicted by the ERA's
most vigorous supporters and by its most vehement opponents.
Whether the ERA is only symbolic will not be clear on the day of rati-
fication and it may remain unclear for one hundred years thereafter if
the fourteenth amendments privileges or immunities clause is any in-
dication.
If the effect of the ratification of the ERA turns out to be more than
declaratory and symbolic, it might prove harmful. It might weaken
the protection which the fourteenth amendment gives against discrim-
87. The fifteen nonratifying states are mostly in the South and have a dispropor-
tionately small population. See note 46 supra.
88. Legislation could be enacted to become effective only on the ERA's ratification.
It would be better to make any legislation effective immediately, with a severability
provision reciting that should the legislation be held unconstitutional in whole or in
part prior to the effective date of the ERA, it is the intent of Congress that the legis-
lation shall become fully effective to the extent that the ERA removes any constitu-
tional obstacles, on the effective date of the amendment.
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ination unrelated to sex-race, religion, alienage, nationality, illegiti-
macy, political beliefs, political associations, handicaps, age, youth,
or poverty. If explicit constitutional text is required to produce effec-
tive remedial legislation or the most rigorous judicial scrutiny against
these discriminations-and our list is only illustrative-each classifi-
cation identifies a group which does not qualify. If women, who are a
majority of the nation's population eligible to vote, have a claim to a
constitutional amendment (whether or not the amendment is more
than symbolic), which among these minorities should be denied and
for what reasons? All are more insular than women and some are
surely as discrete.89
John Marshall called on us always to remember that "it is a consti-
tution we are expounding." 90 Justice Frankfurter called this "the sin-
gle most important utterance in the literature of constitutional
law-most important because most comprehensive and comprehend-
ing."9' Surely the principle comprehends that it is a constitution when
we are asked to amend it. There are better places for the symbols, the
medals, the campaign ribbons, and the slogans.
IV. CONCLUSION: SOUNDING BRASS VERSUS
TINKLING SYMBOLISM?
As of early 1978, the easily demonstrable case against adopting the
ERA is that is is not needed. Equal rights for women have either been
achieved already, or achievement will require enactment of new stat-
utes and their enforcement. The federal ERA does not purport to
compel Congress to legislate, and it authorizes no federal statute not
authorized by the Constitution without amendment. The ERA might
provide impetus to persuade the Court to reverse some case it has de-
cided in the last six years, but that case cannot be identified. In any
event, it would almost surely be a case the result of which Congress
can now change without the ERA.
The ERA was clearly needed in 1873, when only Chief Justice
Chase voted to sustain Myra Bradwell's constitutional claim. A good
case could be made that the ERA was needed in 1972, when Congress
89. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
90. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in
original).
91. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217,
219(1955).
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submitted it to the states. In 1972, the Supreme Court's constitutional
law of sex discrimination consisted only of Reed v. Reed and some
derelict decisions out of the past. Only a few lonely voices, principally
that of Paul Freund, identified the derelicts for what they were and as-
serted the now demonstrable truth that legislation must be the way.
That part of his conclusion remains true without regard to whether
the ERA becomes part of the Constitution's text.
The important rights of women not yet realized are in employ-
ment-equal opportunities for jobs, and equal pay (including fringe
benefits) for equal work. Most of the remaining discrimination is now
in private and not government employment, but the ERA forbids only
discrimination "by the United States or by any State." Without federal
legislation, which the commerce clause is fully as adequate to autho-
rize as the enforcement clause of the ERA or of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the ERA does not itself forbid discrimination by a private em-
ployer.
The ineffectiveness of the ERA, except as a symbol, has been
overlooked in the increasingly shrill forecasts-and necessary rebut-
tals to the forecasts-of frightening or unwanted changes in society or
the family that the amendment may produce. Some of the forecast
changes may indeed take place. They may be cause for alarm or for
gratification. In any event, public discussion of all such possibilities
should be welcomed. However, any possibility that ratification of the
ERA will produce those changes, or that nonratification will prevent
them, is almost beyond rational discourse.
This leaves an important and unique issue on which reasonable
men and women may differ. If a constitutional amendment will make
no change in the law, but is deeply desired as a symbol, is there any
adequate reason to oppose it?
Our answer to that question should not be overstated, lest over-
statement contribute to the possibility of harm that we fear from even
a clearly symbolic amendment. Nevertheless, we would assert that the
Constitution should never be amended except when there are identifi-
able and necessary changes to be made in constitutional law. There
are two reasons.
First, an insistence upon achieving a result through the Constitu-
tion rather than by statute, ordinance, or regulation tends to stultify
and to bypass the legislative function. It is familiar wisdom-but wis-
dom nonetheless-that judicial decisions should not be based upon
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constitutional interpretation if a nonconstitutional basis for the decision
is readily available. All of the same reasons apply when the choice is
between achieving a result by a statute or by amending the Constitu-
tion. Legislation is easier to enact, easier to improve, and more certain
to achieve the desired results.
Second, the most serious danger from an unnecessary, though sym-
bolic, amendment to the Constitution is that such an amendment
would itself set a constitutional precedent. Once such precedent ex-
ists, can sex long continue to be the only cause for discrimination
which the Constitution explicitly forbids? Symbolic amendment is a
harmful precedent because the amendment process itself produces di-
versionary arguments filled with predictions, prophecies, and fanta-
sies, all at the expense of analysis of real problems and the search for
the best solutions.
Neither of these reasons for opposing a purely symbolic amend-
ment to the United States Constitution applies to ERA counterparts in
state constitutions. State constitutions are different. They are longer
than the United States Constitution, they are usually much easier to
amend, and they are already filled with the detritus from causes and
struggles, many of them long since forgotten.92 One reason for the dif-
ferences is that state constitutions are charters for governments whose
functions span the whole broad range of law not delegated to the Con-
gress of the United States. Another reason is that any advocate of leg-
islation is likely to prefer to put his proposal in the constitution, if
possible, because the constitution cannot be amended as easily as a
statute.
Irreversibility is not an adequate reason for the ERA. The eight-
eenth amendment to the United States Constitution is a good remind-
er why. Although prohibition became effective in 1920, it lasted less
than fourteen years. The twenty-first amendment which repealed it
was ratified by the states less than a year after it was submitted. 93 Be-
92. Note, California's Constitutional A mendomania, 1 STAN. L. REV. 279 (1949).
93. The eighteenth amendment was submitted to the states in December 1917;
ratification was completed in January 1919; and it became effective in January 1920.
S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1973). Ratification of the twenty-first
amendment was even faster, with submission in February 1933, and ratification by De-
cember 1933. Id. at 38-39.
Today, a constitutional amendment would be unnecessary if Congress, for the first
time, wished to prohibit liquor by statute. Its power under the commerce clause would
be adequate, except for § 2 of the twenty-first amendment, which has been held to give
the states an autonomy which they have with respect to no product except liquor. E.g.,
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cause the decisions were at constitutional level, there was little oppor-
tunity for intermediate choices. Constitutionalizing the noble experi-
ment probably had a great deal to do with making whiskey our
national drink, rather than light wine and beer.
As of early 1978, there is a national consensus that men and
women should have equal rights. The best prescription for irreversi-
bility of that consensus is to recognize that additional words in the
Constitution are quite unnecessary to secure the full enjoyment of
those rights. Whether or not the ERA becomes the twenty-seventh
amendment, equality of rights for men and women is now an historic
fact in the progress of mankind. It should not be confused with an un-
certain political event which has not yet happened-ratification of the
ERA. Any representation that the ERA is needed for some constitu-
tional purpose, other than symbolic, is flatly wrong. It is a basic mis-
perception of the function of the Constitution of the United States.
The success of the Constitution depends on people who support it and
amend it knowing how their Constitution works. The full enjoyment
of equality of rights for men and women depends on recognizing suc-
cesses as they come.
The Constitution has probably done as much as any words in a
constitutional text can do to eliminate sex discrimination. This is cer-
tainly true of the words which the ERA would add, aside from the
possibility of emanations from the ERA as a symbol. That possibility
is at once so remote and so totally unpredictable that no extended ar-
gument against symbolic constitutional amendment is necessary. For
success, there are now symbols enough.
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (state regulation of "bacchanalian revelries"
in bars upheld, although "unconstitutional on its face" but for § 2); State Bd. v.
Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936) (discrimination in favor of local beer upheld).
This does not suggest that the eighteenth amendment was purely symbolic, or that
prohibition could in 1917 have been adopted by statute without amendment, although
wartime prohibition to conserve foodstuffs was upheld as a war measure. Hamilton v.
Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
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APPENDIX
Senator Birch Bayh submitted Senate Report No. 68994 a week be-
fore the Senate passed the House Resolution which submitted the
Equal Rights Amendment to the states. For some unaccountable rea-
son, the 1972 United States Code Congressional and Administrative
News did not reproduce it, and hence it is not readily available to
many lawyers. We here reproduce, with our own footnotes added, the
section captioned Inadequacy of Legislative or Judicial Relief.95
It is sometimes argued that all of the discriminatory laws and prac-
tices which exist could be eliminated without a constitutional amend-
ment. If the Supreme Court were to hold that discrimination based on
sex, like discrimination based on race, is inherently "suspect" and
cannot be justified in the absence of a "compelling and overriding
state interest", then part of the reason for the Amendment would
disappear. But the Court has persistently refused so to hold. Indeed,
the Court has upheld many laws which plainly discriminate against
women.
Its first significant case involving sex discrimination was Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872),96 in which the Court upheld the refus-
al of the Supreme Court of Illinois to allow women to practice law.
The Court relied on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and not the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses, to uphold the law.97 Two years later, the Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not confer on women citizens the right to
vote, in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874),98 a position which
stood until ratification of the Suffrage Amendment in 1920.
Later, the Court began to apply a standard of "reasonableness" to
laws which discriminated on the basis of sex. This test was employed
94. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
95. Id. at 9-11.
96. Sic. The 1872 date frequently assigned is the December 1872 Term, reported
in the United States Reports. Bradwell v. State, 21 L. Ed. 442, gives January 18, 1873,
as the date of argument, and April 15, 1873, the date of decision. Without accuracy of
dates, the relationship between Slaughter-House and Bradwell is easy to overlook.
97. It is altogether inaccurate to say that "the Court relied on the Privileges and
[sic] Immunities Clause." Myra Bradwell relied, unsuccessfully, on that clause. The
Court relied on the constitutional principle redundantly stated in the tenth amendment,
held to be unaltered by the fourteenth amendment.
98. Sic. 21 Wall. 162 gives the date of decision as March 29, 1875. A unanimous
Court reaffirmed that women are indeed citizens, but noted that they had not been per-
mitted to vote since New Jersey abolished that right in 1807.
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to uphold against constitutional attack labor laws which appeared to
have little if any reasonable justification. A good example is the case
of Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), 99 in which the Court
upheld a Michigan statute prohibiting all females-other than the
wives and daughters of male licensees-from being licensed as barten-
ders. The Court in Goesart assumed that such patently discriminatory
legislation could be sustained if it were "reasonably" related to the
State's objective in making such a classification. The Court did not
even explore the possibility that a more rigorous constitutional stan-
dard should be applied.
More recently, in Hoyt v. Florida, 386100 U.S. 57 (1967), the Court
upheld a Florida statute providing that no female would be called for
jury service unless she had registered to be placed on the jury list. The
Court found that such discrimination was permissilbe [sic] under the
Fourteenth Amendment, since it was reasonable
... for a state, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to con-
clude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury
service unless she herself determines that such service is consis-
tent with her own special responsibilities.
Last year the Supreme Court for the first time struck down a law
which discriminated against women. In Reed v. Reed, - U.S.
,40 U.S.L.W. 4013 (1971),101 the Court invalidated a State
law which arbitrarily favored men over women as administrators of es-
tates. But the Court did not overrule such cases as Goesart and Hoyt,
and it did not hold that sex discrimination is "suspect" under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Instead, the Court left the burden on every woman
plaintiff to prove that governmental action perpetuating sex discrimina-
99. Sic. Goesaert v. Cleary was overruled in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23
(1976). Shepard's Citations may not use its "o" for "overruled" symbol, because this
portion of Justice Brennan's opinion is adhered to by only a four-Justice plurality.
Lower federal courts, however, had long recognized that the decision is discredited.
Even the three dissenting Justices, who objected to discriminating between women
who are and those who are not related to the bar owner, wrote an opinion which will
hold no water.
100. Sic. Hoyt v. Florida, correctly cited as 368 U.S. 57 (1967), was overruled in
all but the use of that word ("[W] e cannot follow the contrary implications of the
prior cases, including Hoyt v. Florida.") in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537
(1975). Only Justice Rehnquist dissented in Taylor, but he recognized that the Louisi-
ana system which excused women from juries unless they waived their exemption
"is in fact an anachronism." Id. at 542.
101. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Chief Justice Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court
was a demonstration that unanimity may be purchased at a price. In Reed, however,
the price may have been worth it. The mechanistic two-tier jurisprudence of "strict
scrutiny" or "rational basis" review has lost whatever semblance of reliability it may
have had in the years before Reed.
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tion is "unreasonable". And that is a difficult burden to carry, indeed.
As the Association of the Bar of the City of New York pointed out in its
recent report "[t] he 1971 Reed case indicated no substantial change
in judicial attitude." Passage of the Equal Rights Amendment will
make it clear that the burden is not on each woman plaintiff to show
sex discrimination is "unreasonable"; the Amendment will, instead,
assure all men and women the right to be free from discrimination
based on sex.
Of course, it would theoretically be possible for Congress and
each State to revise their laws and eliminate those which discriminate
against women. But without the impetus of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, that process would be far too haphazard and much too slow to
be acceptable. We cannot afford to wait any longer for Congress and
each of the 50 State legislatures to find the time to debate and revise
their laws. As in other areas where the Constitution has been amend-
ed, there is an imperative for immediate action. The Nation has wait-
ed too long already-it has been 49 years since the Equal Rights
Amendment was first introduced. Only a constitutional amendment
can provide the legal and practical basis for the necessary changes.
Finally, we cannot overlook the immense symbolic importance of
the Equal Rights Amendment. The women of our country must have
tangible evidence of our commitment to guarantee equal treatment un-
der law. An amendment to the Constitution has great moral and persu-
asive value. Every citizen recognizes the importance of a constitution-
al amendment, for the Constitution declares the most basic policies of
our Nation as well as the supreme law of the land.
The Committee concludes that because of the pervasive legal sex
discrimination which now exists, and because of the inadequacy of
legislative and judicial remedies, there is a clear and undeniable need
for the Equal Rights Amendment. 10 2
Victory has been well said to have a thousand fathers [sic], and
hence it is hard to trace causation of developments since 1972 to the
ERA, but whatever the cause or causes, it is clear that the spring of
1972 was long, long ago. The Constitution of 1972 has, in effect,
already been amended.
102. The ERA applies only to discrimination by the United States or by a state-
not to discrimination which is not the product of state or federal action. If some re-
form sought by sponsors of the ERA is beyond the reach of federal and state legisla-
tion, for which it is unnecessary to wait for two years after the ERA's ratification, we
have not discovered it.
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